

Nigerian Palm Oil Sector

Weaker CPO prices dim sector outlook

- Following the H1 18 results and our recent discussion with Management, we update our assessment of the palm oil sector and outlook for Okomu and Presco. In the wake of weakening global crude palm oil (CPO) prices and relative stability in the naira at the parallel market, domestic CPO prices have trended lower with passthrough on margins and earnings of our coverage companies. We also look at the current market dynamic and the inherent opportunities that abound for sector players given Nigeria's position as a net importer of CPO.
- We believe the recent sell-off in the shares of Okomu and Presco provides upside opportunity for investors as valuations remain undervalued to the inherent sector opportunities and earnings outlook. Particularly, at 8.8x, the sector's mean P/E remains cheap relative to Bloomberg Africa peers (13.65x). Across our coverage, we prefer Okomu due to expectation of lower interest expense emanating from its slimmer debt profile compared to that of Presco. Also, the demand-supply gap for CPO coupled with Okomu's expansion plans guides to stronger earnings in the medium term. Hence, our FVE embodies 26% upside from current pricing for Okomu (¥92.45) and a 26% for Presco (¥67.47). Accordinly, we have a **STRONG BUY** rating on Okomu, been a top 20 stock and a **BUY** rating on Presco.

| Company | | New FVE | | |
|---------|--------------------------|------------------|--------|--------|
| Name | Old FVE (N) | (N) | Upside | Rating |
| | | | | STRONG |
| Okomu | 102.33 | 92.45 | 26% | BUY |
| Presco | 68.84 | 67.47 | 26% | BUY |

Source: ARM Research

OKOMU

| Rating | STRONG BUY |
|---------------------------------|--------------------|
| Price | № 73.20 |
| FVE | ₩92.45 |
| 52-week range | ₩70.1 – ₩94.7 |
| Market Cap. (N 'mn) | 66,869 |
| 1-month Avg. Vol | 155,377 |
| Curr. PE | 8.29x |

PRESCO

| Rating | BUY |
|---------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| Price | № 53.35 |
| FVE | ₩67.47 |
| 52-week range | № 53.35 – № 78 |
| Market Cap. (N 'mn) | 56,550 |
| 1-month Avg. Vol | 50,886 |
| Curr. PE | 9.2x |

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Earnings suffer setback on CPO price plunge


So far this year, the palm oil sector has struggled to replicate the spectacular feat in earnings achieved last year. The uninspiring performance over H1 2018 was mainly driven by lower CPO prices which declined 7.3% YoY on the back of widening glut in the global CPO market (4.5MMT in 2018 vs 3.2MMT¹ in 2017). The glut expansion stemmed from improved weather patterns, large oil extraction from high yield seedlings in Indonesia and Malaysia, and more importantly India's decision to raise crude and refined palm oil tariff ²to their highest level in over a decade further dampened export prospects and prices – India is the largest consumer of CPO. Consequently, given that local prices are reflective of global CPO prices, Okomu had an average price of ¥395,032/MT over H1 18 which is 16% lower than last year's average price. In addition, the relative stability in the naira, particularly at the parallel market segment encouraged smuggling activities into Nigeria which further exerted downward pressure on domestic CPO prices. Specifically, the management of Okomu alluded to rising illegal CPO import flowing from Benin Republic as providing support to lower domestic CPO prices.

From our findings, over the last five years, importation of CPO into Benin Republic has been exceeding its domestic consumption. For context, Benin Republic imported 314,591MT of CPO from Malaysia in 2017 whereas its domestic consumption stood at 135,000 MT in the same period, and its import in H1 2018 of 110,826 MT is only 18% shy of touching last year's annual domestic consumption. In our view, it appears the excess CPO imports have been finding its way illegally into Nigeria thus, bypassing imports duties and providing further legroom for cheaper CPO in the Nigerian market. Furthermore, local refined CPO prices also buckled under falling global CPO prices with FEWSNET reporting an 18% YoY drop in prices to \$\frac{\text{N}}{2}505,023/MT\$. This largely accounted for the 9.1% YoY dip in Presco's top line over the first half of the year.

¹ MT means metric tons

² India raised import tax on crude palm oil to 44 percent from 30 percent and lifted the tax on refined palm oil to 54 percent from 40 percent

Figure 1: Trend in local refined, domestic (N/MT) and global crude palm oil prices




Source: Company sources, FEWSNET, Bloomberg and ARM Research

Downtrodden Rubber Prices

Global rubber prices also towed similar path as CPO over H1 2018 with prices falling 15% YoY to \$1.52/kg due to glut following expiration of an agreement between Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia to reduce exports (the 3 countries accounts for ~ 70% of global rubber supply). Thus, given that Okomu exports all its rubber, its rubber prices were largely reflective of external influences as management reported that prices plunged 12% to \$\frac{N}{4}\$19,340/MT over H1 2018. However, Okomu entered into a forward contract with off takers for its rubber before delivery (six months to one year) at a higher price which provided cover against sliding global rubber prices and translated into a 13% YoY expansion in export sales over H1 2018. However, going into subsequent quarters, the pass through of weaker rubber prices could filter into earnings as current contracts reflects weaker prices. Meanwhile, we did not see the impact of dwindling rubber prices on Presco's earnings as its rubber trees are yet to mature.

Figure 2: Trend in Global rubber prices (\$/kg)



Sources: Bloomberg, ARM Research

CPO Volumes: Resilient half year

On volumes, Okomu witnessed a brilliant first quarter with volumes touching a thirteen-quarter high of 14,972 MT. According to management, this reflects the impact of favorable weather condition, expansion in matured area to 10,620 (+8% YoY) and higher Fresh Fruit Bunches (FFB) yield/ha (9% YoY) over the period. However, due to the onset of the lean season, yield on Okomu's plantation dipped resulting in a 13% YoY plunged in volumes to 11,696 MT in Q2 18. Also given that Presco's revenue dipped 9% YoY over H1 2018 on the back of falling refined CPO prices (-10% YoY to \$\frac{\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\geq}}}}{435,320}\$) we believe volumes were slightly higher over the period. This stemmed from supply to wholesalers and blue-chip consumer goods companies such as Nestle Nigeria and Dangote Group which saw improved top line growth.

11,696

Q2

14,972 16,000 13,391 14,000 11,327 11,646 12,000 9,707 9,894 9,275 9,002 10,000 8,000 6,581 6,322 6,133 5,329 6,000

Q2

Q1

Q4

4.490

Q4

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

Q1

Q3

2015 2015 2015 2015 2016 2016 2016 2016 2017 2017 2017 2017 2018 2018

Figure 3: Trend in Okomu's volumes (MT)

Q3

Q1

4,000 2,000

Q2

Market dynamics provides room for cheer

We highlight that a large percentage of Nigeria's CPO production is controlled by numerous small-scale farm holders with CPO output from key producers including Okomu and Presco accounting for ~8% of the total market although, individually holding sizeable market share due to their robust capacity (combined annual capacity at 78,000MT) compared to small farmers. However, despite recent government efforts to boost domestic production of CPO, local production still lags behind overall domestic consumption. In fact, according to available data from United States Department Agency (USDA), production has remained around 970 thousand MT, in the last 5-years, trailing domestic consumption of 1.4 million MT over the same period. We attribute the short fall to slowdown in investment from large corporates into the sector even despite sufficient arable land conducive for palm oil cultivation in Nigeria. That said, the demandsupply gap, which presently is around 430 thousand MT makes Nigeria a net importer of CPO with its imports largely sourced from Malaysia and Indonesia where production of CPO outweighs consumption. However, in recent times we have seen renewed interest in Nigeria's CPO market with PZ Wilmar investing more than \$650 million oil palm plantations and processing facilities. The company has planted almost 26,500 hectares of palm oil in Cross river state and installed about 65 tonne per hour palm oil mill which by our estimate translates to annual capacity of ~40,000 MT. No doubt, this is a drop in the ocean given Nigeria's current deficit picture (430,000 MT). In the light of this, we believe there is still scope for sector players— Okomu and Presco to expand capacity and grow volumes which guides to a possible leap in earnings in the medium to long term.




Figure 4: Trend in CPO demand and supply in Nigeria (KMT)

Source: USDA, ARM Research

Moving Forward with Expansion Plans

Over 2018, Management of Okomu hinted at ¥12 billion Capital expenditure plan majorly to meet expansion needs at its newly launched Extension 2 plant with likely funding sources from cheap CBN/BOI Agric lending facilities (~9%) and retained earnings. Accordingly, the company raised ¥1.95 billion in term loans from the Bank of Industry under the Agriculture Credit loan at an interest rate of 10% in April 2018 which led to a jump in terms loans from ¥1.1 billion in Q1 18 to ¥2.9 billion in Q2 18. In terms of specific project, management guided to building two new oil mills at its Extension 2 plant, both 30 ton/hour at peak which is expected to cost ¥5 billion. The First plant is scheduled to be commissioned in 2020, while the second will come on board between 2021 and 2022. Furthermore, according to management the first area to mature in Ext 2 will be what was planted in 2016 which is expected to add 1300 hectares to its existing matured area in 2018.

In a bid to diversify its revenue base, Presco plans to tap into the rubber markets which should be an additional source of foreign exchange (aside Palm Kernel export). In line with its plan, Presco has concluded the acquisition 17,600 ha of land in Edo state where it plans to plant palm oil and develop a bud wood garden nursery for the actualization of its investment in rubber. In terms of expertise to manage the rubber business, PRESCO can take advantage of the expertise of its parent company—Siat NV, which already produces rubber in Ivory Coast, Gabon, Cambodia, Belgium and Ghana. However, we are yet to reach management of Presco to get clarity on the timing for the maturity of its first set of planted rubber trees hence, we did not factor it into out valuation for the company.

OKOMU OIL PALM PLC: Lower CPO price submerge earnings

On the heels of lower than expected CPO prices over 2018 we cut our FVE by 10% to \$92.45. However, given current share price of \$73.2 which implies a 26% upside on the stock we have a **STRONG BUY** rating on the stock. Okomu trades at a FY 18E P/E of 8.29x which is at a discount to Presco's 9.2x and Bloomberg MENA peers of 13.65x. At current price, our dividend expectation of \$2.28 over FY 18E translates to a dividend yield of 3%.

- Revenue plunge on price slip: Going forward, the expectation of weaker global CPO prices provides scope for lower domestic CPO prices. Overlaying this with lower global rubber prices which could translate to weaker export sales, we project a 6% YoY drop in 2018E revenues to \$\frac{\text{\text{N}}}{19.02}\$ billion.
- Higher Cost fuels gross profit contraction: Management stated that the abysmally low COGS (№22 million) reported in Q2 17 was an error and stated that the FY 2017 COGS of №4.23 billion reflects adjustments made to make up for error. Thus, we normalize Q2 17 COGS to №591.7 billion to reflect 5-year historical COGS average for the company. Based on new adjustments, over Q2 2018, Okomu faced cost pressures with cost of sales significantly higher (+93% YoY to №1.14 billion in Q2 2018). Management linked the spike in cost of sales to the onset of lean season, higher cost of fertilizer purchased earlier in the year and Energy pressures due to bottleneck faced with achieving its planned Energy mix (40% Genset and 60% BEDC³) as Energy mix of 65% genset and 35% BEDC fell short of target. Going forward, while management guided to normalization of cost of fertilizer in Q3 2018, the onset of lean season which is usually the planting period for Okomu presents the possibility for higher cost going into rest of the year. More so, given the lingering bottlenecks faced by the BEDC we see scope for higher cost of sales over the rest of the year. Thus, we raise our cost of sales expectation for 2018 by 15% YoY to №4.85 billion.
- Slimmer Finance costs to offset Higher OPEX: Having fully paid down the FCY portion of its long-term borrowings (€10 million) owed to its parent company—SOCFINAF S.A in Q1 2018, we model a 43% YoY decline in interest expense over 2018. In our view, this should help mask impact of higher operating expenses (FY 18E: +5% YoY to ¥5.3 billion) over the rest of the year.
- *Catalysts:* Further depreciation in the naira at the parallel market and uptrend in global CPO prices would drive CPO prices higher which is positive for Okomu's revenue.
- *Valuation:* On balance, we now look for FY 18E PAT of ₹7.5 billion (-18.1% YoY). Base on the forgoing we cut our Fair value estimate (**FVE**) by 10.5% to ₹92.45 which implies a 26% upside from current pricing. Hence, we have a **STRONG BUY** rating on the stock. Okomu trades at a P/E of 8.29x relative to Presco's 9.2x and 13.65x for Bloomberg MENA peers.

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³ BEDC: Benin Electricity Distribution Company

Summary of Results and Forecasts: OKOMU

| ANNUAL | | | | | |
|-------------------------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| Income Statement (N'000) | 2016A | 2017A | 2018E | 2019F | 2020F |
| Revenue | 14,364,736 | 20,261,918 | 19,024,457 | 20,429,060 | 21,395,001 |
| Cost of Goods Sold | 3,589,490 | 4,226,453 | 4,851,236 | 4,800,829 | 4,599,925 |
| Gross Profit | 10,775,246 | 16,035,465 | 14,173,220 | 15,628,231 | 16,795,076 |
| Operating Cost | 3,938,414 | 5,060,809 | 5,326,848 | 5,107,265 | 5,134,800 |
| Other operating income (loss) | 114,730 | 153,530 | 114,147 | 122,574 | 128,370 |
| Operating Profit | 6,951,562 | 11,128,186 | 8,960,519 | 10,643,540 | 11,788,646 |
| Interest expense | 1,340,588 | 484,382 | 275,331 | 194,039 | 196,342 |
| Pre-tax Profit | 5,906,453 | 11,140,142 | 9,141,361 | 10,973,719 | 12,088,241 |
| Тах | 996,180 | 1,992,292 | 1,645,445 | 1,975,269 | 2,417,648 |
| PAT | 4,910,273 | 9,147,850 | 7,495,916 | 8,998,449 | 9,670,592 |
| Balance Sheet (N '000) * | | | | | |
| | | | | | |
| Fixed Assets | 9,217,423 | 11,216,535 | 14,717,040 | 18,235,769 | 20,568,724 |
| Inventory | 1,719,080 | 2,687,196 | 2,231,569 | 2,208,381 | 2,115,966 |
| Trade debtors | 505,729 | 978,133 | 760,978 | 817,162 | 855,800 |
| Cash & other bank balances | 3,198,251 | 3,093,792 | 4,136,790 | 5,781,954 | 9,059,036 |
| Total Assets | 24,507,665 | 31,372,152 | 37,330,081 | 44,300,215 | 51,622,503 |
| Liabilities | | | | | |
| Trade Creditors | 641,148 | 487,695 | 873,223 | 864,149 | 827,987 |
| Current Liabilities | 3,007,934 | 3,768,398 | 4,251,135 | 4,288,722 | 4,302,953 |
| Total liabilities | 7,495,624 | 6,865,262 | 7,501,091 | 7,722,388 | 7,791,731 |
| Shareholders' fund | 24,507,664 | 31,372,152 | 37,330,081 | 44,300,215 | 51,622,503 |
| Key Ratios | 2016A | 2017A | 2018E | 2019F | 2020F |
| Gross Margin | 75% | 79% | 75% | 77% | 79% |
| EBIT Margin | 48% | 55% | 47% | 52% | 55% |
| PBT Margin | 41% | 55% | 48% | 54% | 57% |
| Net Margin | 34% | 45% | 39% | 44% | 45% |
| EPS | 5.1 | 9.6 | 7.9 | 9.4 | 10.1 |
| P/E | 7.3 | 6.8 | 8.3 | 8.2 | 7.6 |
| EV/EBITDA | 6.1 | 3.9 | 4.5 | 3.5 | 2.9 |
| ROA | 20.0% | 29.2% | 20.1% | 20.3% | 18.7% |
| ROE | 33.8% | 44.1% | 27.6% | 27.1% | 24.1% |

PRESCO Plc: Bumpy road ahead

Following lower than expected CPO prices as well as expectation of higher interest expense tailing ramp up in Presco's debt stock over the period we cut our FVE by 2% to **\\(\mathbb{H}67.47\)** which retains our **BUY** rating on the stock. Presco trades at a FY 18E P/E of 9.2x relative to Okomu's 8.29x and Bloomberg MENA peers of 13.65x. At current price, our dividend expectation of $\(\mathbb{H}1.13\) over FY 18E translates to a dividend yield of 2%.$

- **Price plunge prompts revenue slip:** We expect an 8.3% YoY drop in revenue to \$\frac{\text{N}}{2}0.5\$ billion over FY 18E. This is largely driven by tamer refined CPO prices (FEWSNET: -15% YTD to \$\frac{\text{N}}{4}66,700/MT)\$ which is in consonance with falling global CPO prices. However, in line with recent trend where cost pressures have been dissipating, we model a faster drop in input cost (17% YoY) to \$\frac{\text{N}}{4}.9\$ billion with gross margin expanding +260bps YoY to 76% over 2018.
- *Higher borrowings propel interest expense higher:* So far this year, Presco's borrowings is up 149% to \$\frac{\text{\text{M}}}{9.9}\$ billion from December 2017 levels as it continues its expansion drive into FY 18E. Accordingly we expect that this would translate to higher finance expense over FY 18E thereby, informing our upward review of Interest expense to \$\frac{\text{\text{M}}}{1.55}\$ billion (+58.9% YoY). Based on the foregoing, interest coverage ratio is expected to trail five-year average of 7.91x to 5.87x over 2018E while Debt to Equity ratio is expected to spike to 12.6% over 2018E from 7% in FY 17.
- *Catalysts:* Further depreciation in the naira at the parallel market and uptrend in global CPO prices would drive CPO prices higher which is positive for Presco's revenue.
- Valuation: Overall, on the heels of tamer CPO prices and higher interest expense we now look for a 17.5% YoY decline in 2018E PBT to №9.03 billion (excluding biological gains). However, based on the recent depreciation in the share price of Presco (-22% YTD) our FVE of №67.47 translate to a 26% upside on the stock and hence, we have a BUY rating on the stock. Presco trades at a P/E of 9.2x relative to 8.29x for Okomu and 13.65x for Bloomberg MENA peers.

Summary of Results and Forecasts: PRESCO

| ANNUAL | | | | | |
|-------------------------------|------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| Income Statement (N'000) | 2016A | 2017A | 2018E | 2019F | 2020F |
| Revenue | 15,716,198 | 22,365,372 | 20,516,053 | 22,953,939 | 25,095,708 |
| Cost of Goods Sold | 4,404,785 | 5,941,308 | 4,923,853 | 5,853,255 | 5,897,491 |
| Gross Profit | 11,311,413 | 16,424,064 | 15,592,201 | 17,100,685 | 19,198,216 |
| Operating Cost | 4,398,081 | 7,501,666 | 5,215,181 | 5,727,008 | 6,273,927 |
| Other operating income (loss) | 118,489 | 213,358 | 205,161 | 642,710 | 702,680 |
| Operating Profit | 7,031,821 | 9,135,756 | 10,582,180 | 12,016,387 | 13,626,969 |
| Net Interest expense | 684,655 | 973,479 | 1,547,263 | 1,761,849 | 1,625,941 |
| Pre-tax Profit | 31,226,453 | 10,951,581 | 9,034,917 | 10,254,538 | 12,001,028 |
| Tax | 9,490,987 | -14,452,033 | 2,891,173 | 3,281,452 | 3,840,329 |
| PAT | 21,735,466 | 25,403,614 | 6,143,744 | 6,973,086 | 8,160,699 |
| Balance Sheet (N '000) * | | | | | |
| | | | | | |
| Fixed Assets | 22,444,657 | 28,122,101 | 30,510,313 | 33,201,459 | 36,114,373 |
| Inventory | 1,420,597 | 4,704,706 | 1,772,587 | 2,107,172 | 2,123,097 |
| Trade debtors | 1,095,901 | 3,607,661 | 3,118,440 | 3,488,999 | 3,814,548 |
| Cash & other bank balances | 2,585,128 | 3,307,211 | 6,663,184 | 9,735,243 | 13,394,054 |
| Total Assets | 83,161,838 | 98,324,096 | 101,381,683 | 108,702,993 | 116,571,979 |
| Liabilities | | | | | |
| Trade Creditors | 1,699,761 | 7,428,137 | 3,692,890 | 4,389,941 | 4,423,118 |
| Current Liabilities | 5,607,551 | 12,974,500 | 6,165,291 | 6,902,482 | 6,974,883 |
| Total liabilities | 31,042,834 | 22,343,924 | 20,388,032 | 21,664,374 | 22,315,221 |
| Shareholders' fund | 83,161,836 | 98,324,096 | 101,381,683 | 108,702,993 | 116,571,979 |
| Key Ratios | 2016A | 2017A | 2018E | 2019F | 2020F |
| Gross Margin | 72% | 73% | 76% | 75% | 77% |
| EBIT Margin | 45% | 41% | 52% | 52% | 54% |
| PBT Margin | 199% | 49% | 44% | 45% | 48% |
| Net Margin | 138% | 114% | 30% | 30% | 33% |
| EPS | 21.7 | 25.4 | 6.1 | 7.0 | 8.2 |
| P/E | 12.49 | 3.03 | 9.2 | 8.1 | 6.9 |
| EV/EBITDA | 7.13 | 5.73 | 4.77 | 4.04 | 3.38 |
| ROA | 31.4% | 28.0% | 6.2% | 6.6% | 7.2% |
| ROE | 41.7% | 33.4% | 7.6% | 8.0% | 8.7% |

ARM ratings and recommendations

ARM now employs a two-tier rating system which is based on systemic importance of the security under review and the deviation of our target price for the stock from current market price. We characterize systemic importance as a function of a stock's ranking among the group of top 20 stocks by NSE market capitalization over a trailing 6-month period (minimum) to the review date. We adopt a 5-point rating system for this category of stocks and a 3-point rating system for stocks outside this group. The choice of top 20 stocks arises from the consideration that this group of stocks constitutes >75% of overall market capitalization and stocks outside this group are generally less liquid and individually account for <<1% of market capitalization. For stocks in both categories, the basis for ratings subject to target price deviation is outlined below:

| TOP 20 | | NON-TOP 20 | |
|-------------|------------|------------|-----------|
| Rating | Deviation | Rating | Deviation |
| STRONG BUY | >20% | BUY | >20% |
| OVERWEIGHT | 10% — 20 % | NEUTRAL | 5% — 20 % |
| NEUTRAL | 0% — 10 % | SELL | <5% |
| UNDERWEIGHT | -5% — 0% | | |
| SELL | <-5% | | |

| RECOMMENDATION | KEY | |
|----------------|---|--|
| Rating | Recommendation | |
| BUY | Accumulate security to a substantial extent constrained only by portfolio diversification considerations | |
| OVERWEIGHT | Accumulate security to an extent moderated by cognizance of its benchmark weight | |
| NEUTRAL | Maintain status quo for security with respect to current holding—i.e. keep if already holding and don't buy otherwise—subject to reasonable portfolio constraints | |
| UNDERWEIGHT | Minimize exposure to security taking cognizance of its index weighting | |
| SELL | Sell-off security completely from portfolio | |
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